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Abstract: Young children, when performing problem solving tasks, show a tendency to break task 
rules and produce incomplete solutions. We propose that this tendency can be explained by 
understanding problem solving within the context of the development of “executive functions” – 
general cognitive control functions which serve to regulate the operation of the cognitive system. 
This proposal is supported by the construction of two computational models that simulate 
separately the performance of 3-4 year old and 5-6 year old children on the Tower of London 
planning task. We seek in particular to capture the emerging role of inhibition in the older group. 
The basic framework within which the models are developed is derived from Fox and Das’ 
domino model (2000) and Norman and Shallice’s (1986) theory of willed and automatic action. 
Two strategies and a simple perceptual bias are implemented within the models and comparisons 
between model and child performance reveal a good fit for the key dependent measures (number 
of rule breaks and percentage of incomplete solutions) of the two groups. 
1 Introduction 
Since the seminal work of Newell and Simon (1972), many researchers have studied problem solving 
using concepts such as problem-spaces, states and operators or moves. From this perspective, problem 
solving involves selecting a series of moves which allows one to move from a representation of the 
current state of a problem to a desired or goal state. The emphasis in this work (as exemplified by 
studies of tasks ranging from the Hobbits and Orcs problem (Thomas, 1974) to the Tower of Hanoi 
(Simon, 1975)) has generally been to investigate the processes by which moves are proposed or 
evaluated.  
A different literature views problem solving as one of many cognitive skills that are under the control 
of the “central executive”. Within this approach, the primary concern is with understanding how the 
human cognitive system is organized and how it operates at a mechanistic level in providing high-
level cognitive functions, such as reasoning and problem solving, within the context of general 
computational control functions. Although accounts of the executive (see e.g., Zelazo, Reznick & 
Frye, 1997; Shallice, 2002) and the extent to which control is achieved by a single, unitary process or 
by many, diverse processes are contended (Miyake, Friedman, Emerson, Witzki, Howerter & Wager, 
2000), a consensus does exist with respect to the notion that certain control functions appear central to 
human cognition. These so-called executive functions are commonly viewed as a set of “general 
purpose control mechanisms that modulate the operation of various cognitive subprocesses and 
thereby regulate the dynamics of cognition” (Miyake et al., 2000, p. 50) and are widely assumed to 
form the basis of our ability to perform complex tasks, including reasoning, planning and problem 
solving. 
A substantial body of research has focused on the role of three specific possible executive functions: 
(1) inhibition of prepotent responses (‘inhibition’), (2) shifting of mental sets (‘shifting’) and (3) 
updating of working memory (‘updating’). These mechanisms have formed the basis of a variety of 
theoretical accounts, often drawing on data from the neurosciences to help elucidate hypothesized 
processes (e.g., Aron, Robbins & Poldrack, 2004; Garavan, Ross, Murphy, Roche & Stein, 2002; 
Sylvester, Wager, Lacey, Hernandez, Nichols, Smith & Jonides, 2003).  Thus, Sylvester et al., (2003) 
demonstrated converging evidence for separable and differential levels of involvement of executive 
function mechanisms across tasks through fMRI studies of attention switching and response 
  
interference. Yet within the literature terms such as “mental flexibility”, “inhibition”, “mental set 
shifting”, “planning”, “problem solving” and “categorisation” (see e.g., Bull, Espy & Seen, 2004; 
Miyake et al., 2000) are frequently used to describe the same or similar processes. In order to properly 
evaluate theories founded on such general control mechanisms one must be explicit in detailing what 
the theorized functions are and how they may be implemented in mechanistic terms. Computational 
modeling offers one way in which accounts of hypothesized mechanisms may be assessed. It thus 
offers the distinct advantage of allowing us to understand which attributes of a particular process may 
have important effects in producing behavior and which do not. 
Our particular concern in this paper is how the putative development of executive functions may 
impact upon problem solving performance. The Tower of London task (Shallice, 1982) is a problem 
solving task that has frequently been employed in studies of executive functioning (e.g., Zook, et al., 
2004), and a number of developmental accounts of performance on the Tower of London exist (see 
e.g., Blair, Zelazo, & Greenberg, 2005) that are broadly supportive of a complex and dynamic 
interaction of mechanisms underlying high-level cognitive processes. For this reason our focus here is 
on modeling the behavior of young children on the Tower of London task at two different points in 
development. Additionally, Houdé (2000) has argued that a key mechanism of cognitive maturation is 
the development of task-general inhibitory mechanisms. Consistent with these views on the 
development of executive function mechanisms we adopt a position that assumes an association 
between age and an increased ability to inhibit a prepotent response. 
In the Tower of London task, subjects are presented with an apparatus that consists of three colored 
balls and a board with three pegs of different lengths. The length of each peg constrains the number of 
balls that can be placed on it to 1, 2, and 3 balls, respectively. Subjects are then presented with a 
picture of the goal state and are asked to move the balls, one at a time, to match the goal using the 
picture as a reference. Two simple Tower of London tasks are shown in Figure 1. Each task can be 
solved in exactly three moves, but more complex tasks, requiring more moves, may easily be 
generated by manipulating the starting and goal states. 
        
        
Figure 1. Two Tower of London tasks, each of which may be solved in three moves 
Within studies of problem solving on the Tower of London, efforts have focused primarily on the 
ability to generate and manage subgoals. This has been assessed through analyses of the number of 
correct solutions on problems of different goal configurations (e.g., flat-ending vs. tower-ending, 
Klahr & Robinson, 1981) and performance on problems of different complexity (i.e., problems in 
which the minimum number of moves required to reach the solution varies) between children of 
different ages. However, a key characteristic of young children’s performance on problem solving 
tasks is their tendency to break task rules and produce partial or incomplete solutions (Waldau, 1999). 
In the context of the Tower of London task, no attempts have thus far been made to account for young 
children’s tendency towards (1) rule breaks (e.g., holding two balls at the same time), or (2) solutions 
that are partially complete (i.e., solutions within only one or two balls in their correct place). 
In line with the aim of this special issue, we demonstrate the advantage of applying cognitive 
modeling to cognitive theory on the Tower of London task. Focusing specifically on the occurrence of 
rule breaks and partial completion on this task, this paper details two computational models that 
provides an explicit account of how these behaviors may arise from differences in the ability to inhibit 
responses and thus offers a bridge between traditional approaches to problem solving and accounts 
based on theories of executive functions and data from the neurosciences. In order to ground our 
account of inhibition on a solid foundation, we phrase our models within a framework derived from 
  
two sources: (1) the Domino model of Fox and Das (2000) and (2) Norman and Shallice’s theory of 
willed and automatic action (1986). 
2 Executive Functions and Cognitive Architecture  
2.1 Experimental evidence for Executive Functions 
A number of tasks, such as the Wisconsin Card Sorting task, the Stroop task and the Tower of Hanoi 
task, that are held to load heavily on different executive functions have been developed. Thus, the 
behavioral effects of the executive function of inhibitory control are typically considered demonstrable 
by superior performance on tasks where an automatic or dominant response should be suppressed. 
This may be the successful inhibition of the tendency to process the semantics rather than the actual 
color of word items on the Stroop test. Conversely, a deficiency in the ability to inhibit is implied by 
poorer performance. 
Theorists arguing both sides of the unity versus diversity debate have used executive tasks to explicate 
the role of executive functions (see e.g., Duncan & Owen, 2000; Miyake et al., 2000). Thus, the claim 
that these tasks measure specific dissociable cognitive functions is derived from observed 
dissociations of performance on them (e.g., Miyake, et al., 2000). However, progress in the isolation 
and study of executive functions has been hindered by the multiple and somewhat “arbitrary and post-
hoc” interpretations of resulting data (Miyake et al., 2000, p. 53; see also Bull et al., 2004).  
With the objective of clarifying some of these issues, Miyake et al. (2000) detail a study in which they 
find support for separable mechanisms of executive functions. Consistent with many previous studies 
and of special relevance to this paper were their findings that inhibition was more strongly associated 
with performance on the Tower of Hanoi task than a range of other executive function tasks. Miyake 
et al. offer a plausible interpretation of these findings, reasoning that in the Tower of Hanoi one is 
influenced by the tendency to move towards greater perceptual similarity rather than move away (see 
also, Simon, 1975). This interpretation fits with numerous other studies in which moves that take the 
configuration of the current state of a problem away from the goal state are described as counter-
intuitive, or undesirable, whilst in fact they are necessary for task completion (Gilhooly, 2002). Such 
moves may also be needed to solve certain Tower of London problems. 
2.2 A framework of behavioral control (SAS and CS) 
Most accounts of executive functions isolate particular putative functions but fail to provide an 
integrative computational framework within which those functions may operate. One plausible 
framework within which various postulated executive functions might be implemented is Norman and 
Shallice’s (1986) theory of willed and automatic action. This is perhaps one of the best-known 
frameworks to embody the diversity view of cognition. Divisible into two distinct but significantly 
related processes that operate according to specific parameters, it comprises an automatic or reactive 
system – contention scheduling (CS) – that is held to control behavior in routine situations, and a 
controlled or deliberative system – the supervisory attentional system (SAS) – that is held to control 
behavior in non-routine situations. Briefly, the CS organizes routine behaviors in the form of schemas 
and is characterized by low-level, predominantly autonomous processes that control everyday actions. 
The SAS imposes a heavy top-down influence on behavior by way of generating goals, creating 
schemas for CS to carry out and monitoring behavior. Problem solving and behavior in general is thus 
held to be the product of the influences of these two interrelated systems, with the SAS more involved 
in novel tasks but the CS taking over when tasks become familiar. The depth and breadth of behavior 
the CS-SAS theory is intended to account for makes it a suitable starting point for modeling the Tower 
of London. 
2.3 The Domino model 
In Norman and Shallice’s original description, the SAS was specified mainly in terms of its functions 
(i.e., how and when it was held to influence the operation of CS). The framework was therefore not 
sufficiently fleshed out to allow the construction of a fully mechanistic account of problem solving on 
  
a task such as the Tower of London. However, in more recent work, Shallice and colleagues (e.g., 
Shallice & Burgess, 1996; Burgess, 2000; Shallice, 2002) have attempted to fractionate or decompose 
the SAS into component subprocesses, such as generating and setting intentions and monitoring 
behavior against current goals. On the basis of this, Glasspool and Cooper (2002: see also Shallice, 
2002, Glasspool, 2005) have shown that the CS-SAS framework is compatible with a computationally 
more explicit general cognitive architecture, Fox and Das’ (2000) Domino model (see Figure 2).  
 
Figure 2. The generalized Domino model of Fox and Das (2000) 
The Domino model represents a highly organized system for decomposing elements of a problem. 
While it is not assumed to be a model of human cognition, it has been used extensively in AI work on 
expert systems (see Fox & Das, 2000), and the principal elements of the model may be related to those 
involved in a GOMS-style analysis of problem solving (Card, Moran & Newell, 1983). Thus, 
processing within the domino involves generating goals (or subgoals) based on beliefs, generating 
possible solutions to those goals, evaluation and selecting from those solutions, etc. 
2.4 Linking the Domino and the CS-SAS framework 
The majority of the Domino processes flesh out the possible operation of the SAS. CS fits in to the 
picture only in the right-most processes associated with actions and plan execution. CS is held to 
consist of a hierarchically structured network of schemas in which processes of interactive activation 
work to select highly active schemas that then trigger basic actions (Cooper & Shallice, 2000). SAS, in 
the form of the other Domono processes, provides a top-down bias to schemas within CS (which 
correspond to actions and routinized sequences of actions), thus encouraging the performance of 
routine behaviors. SAS (and the Domino) only has indirect control of action, however, as the 
interactive activation processes of CS may lead to schemas being selected even without top-down 
excitation. 
3 Problem solving and the Tower of London: Developmental Findings 
The Tower of London task has become a popular tool for measuring problem solving abilities of 
children and adults with neurological impairments. Both the Tower of London and the Tower of Hanoi 
(on which the Tower of London is based) have been held to load heavily on executive functions and, 
in the case of the Tower of London in particular, on inhibition (Bull et al., 2004; Miyake et al, 2000).  
Previous developmental research on the ToL suggests two strategies that young children may use in 
problem solving. These form specific components within the computational models developed here. 
The strategies are (1) an immediate-hit strategy (the tendency to place a ball in its target position 
immediately if the target position is free and the target ball is free to move) and (2) a one-move look-
ahead strategy (the tendency to plan moves up to one-move away). Bull et al., (2004) and Goel, 
Pullara and Grafman (2001) describe these strategies in more detail and provide evidence for their use 
in solving Tower of London problems. 
The target behavioral data for the present work come from a study in which children’s performance on 
two different types of Tower of London problem, tower-ending and flat-ending problems, was 
compared (Waldau, 1999). In this study, two groups of children (3-4 year olds and 5-6 year olds) 
completed six problems (three problems of each type). There were 17 children in each group. Our 
concern here is not the children’s behavior on the specific problem types. Rather it is the degree to 
  
which children in the different age groups produced incomplete solutions or broke task rules in 
coming to their solutions. Table 1 therefore shows the key dependent variables for each age group 
(collapsed over the six problems). In this table, “configuration” refers to the percentage of problems in 
which children’s solutions matched the target solution, regardless of the colors of the balls (e.g., 
having one ball on each peg in the case of a flat-ending problem). “Colors” refers to the percentage of 
problems in which balls were also arranged correctly by color. As can be seen from the table, children 
in both groups were generally good at matching the correct configuration, but on about one-third of 
occasions children in the younger group did so while neglecting the colors of the balls. The between 
group difference was highly significant (t(32) = –3.37, p = 0.002, two-tailed). 
Table 1: Developmental data for the Tower of London 
 3-4 yr olds 5-6 yr olds t(df = 32) p 
Configuration (%) 95.83 96.05 –0.42 0.677 
Colors (%) 66.32 94.74 –3.37 0.002  
Rule breaks (%) 52.08 21.92 2.67 0.012  
Avg. no. moves 11.26 9.79 2.65 0.012  
 
Table 1 also shows that young children broke the task rules on over half of the trials, while the older 
group broke the rules on less than a quarter of trials. The between group difference was highly 
significant (t(32) = 2.67, p = 0.012, two-tailed). At the same time, children in the older group required 
significantly fewer moves than those in the younger group to produce their solutions. 
4 Modeling the Tower of London 
Computational approaches using cognitive architectures such as Soar (Newell, 1990) and ACT-R (e.g., 
Anderson & Lebiere, 1998) have contributed greatly to the study of a wide range of cognitive 
behavior. However, their use has also drawn criticisms on a number of theoretical and technical fronts 
(see e.g., Cooper & Shallice, 1995 and Altman & Trafton, 1999, respectively). In this paper, we seek 
to limit the number of underlying theoretical assumptions in modeling the Tower of London task, and 
therefore rather than use a cognitive architecture with all its architectural assumptions, we adopt the 
COGENT modeling environment (Cooper & Fox, 1998; Cooper, 2002) as a platform in which to 
implement the relevant aspects of the Domino model. 
4.1 The COGENT modeling environment 
COGENT is a visual environment for cognitive modeling that attempts to provide the modeler with 
maximal freedom in developing their model while imposing minimal assumptions on the model. The 
environment builds upon the box and arrow notation popular within information processing 
psychology, while at the same time addressing key limitations of that notation by underpinning it with 
concepts from object-oriented programming and design. Thus, a COGENT model consists of a 
collection of computational “objects”, with each object being an instance of a specified class. Standard 
classes include buffers, rule-based processes and networks. In addition, each class has a set of 
properties. For any instance of an object, the values these properties fully define the computational 
behavior of the instance. Thus, a box within a box and arrow diagram may be specified as a short-term 
limited capacity buffer by specifying that the box is an instance of the buffer class (or a subclass of the 
buffer class) and then by specifying appropriate values for the buffer’s capacity and decay parameters. 
Three COGENT classes are particularly relevant to the models described here. Buffers are components 
that allow information to be stored, either temporarily or permanently, and either with or without 
capacity limitations. Rule-based processes contain sets of condition-action rules. The conditions of 
such rules may match elements in buffers, or carry out more complex logical operations (such as 
matching an element within a list), while the actions may modify buffers or send messages to other 
components. Rules may also have triggering patterns associated with them. Such rules will only fire 
when the process that contains them receives a message that matches their trigger. By default, all rules 
within a rule-based process will operate in parallel. That is, if multiple rules match on a single 
  
processing cycle, or if a rule can be matched in multiple ways on a given processing cycle, then all 
instantiations of those rules will be fired. Finally, interactive activation networks are components that 
contain a set of labeled nodes, each with an activation value. Nodes may be excited or inhibited by 
messages sent to a network, or by processes internal to the network such as self activation and lateral 
inhibition.  
Processing within COGENT is based on a simple blackboard model, in which all components (i.e., all 
boxes, or equivalently, all specified instances of the various classes) operate in parallel, reading from 
the blackboard at the beginning of the processing cycle and writing to it at the end. Thus, in a model 
with several rule-based processes, those processes will all operate in parallel. They will also operate in 
parallel with buffers (whose contents may be decaying over time) and with interactive activation 
networks (whose nodes will be increasing or decreasing in activation over time). 
As should be clear from the above, COGENT allows the inclusion of symbolic and connectionist 
mechanisms within the same model.  The mechanisms are just specified via boxes of different classes, 
with the standard blackboard processing model which allows communication between all components 
within a heterogeneous model. These features make COGENT an attractive environment within which 
to develop the mix of automatic low-level processes assumed within the CS and the higher-level 
processes within the SAS. Furthermore, in contrast to Soar and ACT-R, and as highlighted above, 
COGENT does not specify any particular theoretical architecture within which models must be placed. 
It therefore supports the inclusion of only aspects of theory that are deemed especially relevant. 
4.2 General principles of the model 
The COGENT model consists of two over-arching components: a subject model and an environment 
with which the subject model interacts. The role of the environment is to present the subject model 
with tasks (the six tasks used in the original Waldau (1999) study) and record and collate the subject 
model’s behavior. Programmatic details of the environment are not considered further here, as it is the 
subject model that is of prime importance. 
4.2.1 The Subject 
The arrangement of sub-processes adopted for the subject model (for both younger and older children) 
is displayed in figure 3. This shows the influence of the domino model and Norman and Shallice’s 
CS/SAS theory. Within the figure, round-edged oblongs represent buffers that store information 
during processing, while hexagonal boxes represent processes that operate on buffers or transform 
information.  
The basic operation of the model is as follows. At the beginning of a problem Current State and 
Desired State (parts of the environment) are initialized with representations of the problem. The 
Subject model derives representations of the Current State and Desired State through Perception of 
World. This process extracts simple properties of the task and maintains representations of the 
Current State and Desired State in Working Memory. Problems are recognized as problems by 
Monitoring & Goal Generation if the Current State and Desired State do not exactly match. When 
there is a discrepancy between these two states, a message is produced by Monitoring & Goal 
Generation and sent to Goals. This triggers the use of existing strategies aimed at reducing the 
difference. Strategies delivers representations of the immediate-hits and one-move look ahead 
strategies to Candidate Strategies, which are then analyzed by Evaluate Solutions. 
 
  
 
Figure 3. The processes within Subject 
4.2.2 Evaluate Solutions 
Evaluate Solutions provides intensive processing of information represented within Working 
Memory and to a lesser extent Selected Strategies. The primary objective for this process is to 
evaluate the outcome of proposed solutions, or moves. Evaluate Solutions is responsible for 
identifying immediate-hits (see Figure 4) and look ahead moves (see Figure 5). In the event where 
none exist, Evaluate Solutions starts a process whereby possible moves are proposed to Working 
Memory. Evaluate Solutions calculates what the resultant state would be if that possible move was 
actioned. If an immediate-hit is possible given a resultant state, the possible move is initiated.1 If a 
possible move does not yield an outcome whereby an immediate hit is possible then it is temporarily 
black-listed in Working Memory and another possible move is explored. Once a decision has been 
made to move a ball, automatic processes within Contention Scheduling take over. 
 
Figure 4. Pseudo code showing rules pertaining to the Immediate-hit strategy 
The left-hand side of the model (highlighted by the dashed ellipse, Figure 3) is thus given over to 
decision-making as strategies are proposed and evaluated. For each selected strategy action schemas 
                                                      
1 This tendency to abandon full searches of the problem space for other beneficial moves is consistent with the literature 
(Gilhooly, 2002).  
 
  
are created (via Schema Construction) and fed into Temporary Schemas, serving to excite elements 
within Contention Scheduling. 
  
Figure 5. Pseudo code showing rules pertaining to the one-move look-ahead strategy 
4.2.3 Contention Scheduling 
Within Shared Schema Hierarchy (see figure 6), two basic types of action schemas (‘pick up a ball’ 
and ‘place ball on a peg’) exist that may be applied to six specific actions (pick up red, pick up blue, 
pick up green, put down on left peg, put down on centre peg, put down on right peg). 
In the absence of any strategy (perceptual, or otherwise) schemas corresponding to all possible moves 
receive excitation from the representation of the current state. Specifically, individual schemas that 
correspond to picking up a color ball receive activation if that ball is free to move and schemas for 
putting a ball down on a peg receive activation if the ball is held and there is space on a peg for a ball. 
A move is selected for action and carried out through Act (see figure 7) if the activation of its schema 
passes a threshold value of 0.75.  Processes of lateral inhibition and self excitation ensure that, even in 
the absence of strong top-down excitation, one or more schemas will become active and be proposed 
for action. Though weak inhibition operates between competing schemas it does not prevent two 
schemas becoming selected for action at the same time. Thus, the basic CS mechanism is prone to rule 
breaks that will occur if two schemas exceed the selection threshold simultaneously.  
The behavior of the CS in the absence of top-down input is random – moves are selected and 
performed subject to environmental constraints but with no concern for the achieving the goal state. 
Whilst correct solutions are eventually reached, they may take several hundred moves. This basic 
operation of CS is modulated, however, by one low-level perceptual strategy and two higher-level 
processes within the SAS. 
  
 
 
Figure 6. The interactive-activation network of Contention Scheduling 
Within Contention Scheduling a direct perceptual bias, to move balls to match the configuration of 
the goal state, provides an additional early influence in proposing moves. The level of excitation that 
schemas receive through this perceptual bias is dependent on the level of similarity shared between the 
configuration of the Current State and Desired State. That is, moves leading to one configurally 
correct ball get 0.22 excitation, moves leading to two get 0.44, and moves leading to three get 0.66. 
This low-level bias organizes behavior in such a way that moves are no longer random and the total 
number of moves required to solve a problem is greatly reduced, but any ball that is placed in its 
correct color position is purely coincidental. This bias to move a ball to a location that matches the 
overall configuration of the goal state, but not necessarily the correct color position mirrors findings 
from experimental data and serves to allow basic responses to take place in more complex situations 
where existing strategies do not appear suited. 
Two further strategies that originate from the SAS provide more powerful analysis of the problem 
space. These are the (1) immediate-hit and (2) one-move look-ahead strategies. The immediate-hit 
strategy influences moves that relate to the immediate placement of a ball in its correct position if the 
ball is free and the target position is free. The one-move look-ahead strategy provides a representation 
of the resultant state of possible moves and assesses them with respect to whether they provide 
opportunities for an immediate-hit. 
Figure 7 illustrates the processes within Contention Scheduling in which action schemas (such as 
‘pick up green ball’ and ‘put down on centre peg’) are ultimately produced. Automatic processes 
within Trigger Schemas operate on (1) balls that can be moved and (2) pegs that have space, by 
reading from the Current State. Once a move is made, the contents of Current State and Working 
Memory are updated to reflect the new positions of balls and the process of determining the next 
possible move begins. 
  
 
Figure 7. The contention scheduling process 
4.3  The Younger Child model 
The performance of the Younger Child model is influenced by the existence of two strategies and a 
simple perceptual bias to match the current configuration to the Goal State. The model was run 17 
times on the six problems from the empirical study. The fit of the dependent measures with the 
experimental data appears good for the 3-4 year olds on all criterion measurements (see Table 2), 
though statistical comparisons reveal significant differences on rule breaks and average number of 
moves. 
Table 2. Summary of behavior of younger children and model 1 
 3-4 yr olds Model 1 t(df = 32) p 
Configuration (%) 95.83 100.00 –1.33 0.193 
Colors (%) 66.32 65.74 0.35 0.729 
Rule breaks (%) 52.08 44.11 2.35 0.025 
Avg. no. moves 11.26 6.8 4.95 0.001 
 
Two interrelated processes may account for both the simulated number of rule-breaks and the 
proportion of balls in their correct positions. Firstly, in the absence of strong lateral inhibition between 
nodes, activation of two nodes e.g., ‘pick-up red’ and ‘pick-up blue’ can reach threshold and result in 
both actions being taken. As a ball is picked up, it may reveal another ball to which a second strategy 
applies. Hence, the schema to pickup the second ball can reach threshold before the first ball has been 
placed. This pattern of behavior is consistent with observations of rule breaks by children. 
Secondly, partial completion (or, the mixture of lower number of correct colors and high number of 
correct configurations) is explained as the result of a combination of effects of the immediate-hit 
strategy and the direct, configural bias within Contention Scheduling. Both of these influences are 
concerned with immediate perceptual properties of the Current State. In the case of the former, the 
strategy is concerned purely with placing a ball in its target position and does not process the 
placement of other balls. In the latter, only configural properties are processed. In the course of 
  
problem solving the perceptual features of a problem are present before the results of processing of the 
various strategies have been carried out (i.e., these more intensive processes take longer to return 
proposed moves). Contention Scheduling (containing the bias for configural similarity) is dependent 
on perceptual information only and so has an early advantage at influencing the selection of schemas. 
Thus, the direct influence of Contention Scheduling goes unchecked and impacts on the total number 
of correctly placed balls. The lack of co-ordination between Contention Scheduling and supervisory 
processes suggests the need for greater monitoring and control to inhibit the influence of simple and 
direct perceptual biases that originate from Contention Scheduling. 
4.4 The Older Child model 
In the Older Child model a mechanism of inhibition is introduced in an attempt to limit the occurrence 
of rule breaks and simulate the performance of the 5-6 year olds. Operationally, the second model 
extends upon the first by interrupting the combined influence of immediate-hits and configural bias, 
thereby enabling a greater degree of influence from higher-level strategies. 
The difference between the Younger Child model and Older Child model is embodied as a single rule 
within Monitoring & Goal Generation (see Figure 8 below). If its condition is met a more detailed 
examination of the positions of other balls in the current state is triggered. If this reveals the ball under 
the target position for the immediate-hit is not in place, the strategy is terminated and a new move 
considered. 
 
Figure 8. Inhibiting the immediate-hit strategy if the ball under is not in place 
A comparison of the behavior of this model (run over 17 attempts at each of the six problems) and 
older children is given in Table 3. Overall, it appears that inhibition holds considerable weight on the 
overall behavior of the Older Child model. The proportion of rule breaks is reduced and the overall 
number of balls in the correct color position is higher than in the Younger Child model. T-tests on 
these measures reveal that the difference between model and human performance does not differ 
significantly for configuration or color, while the difference for rule breaks is marginally significant 
(with the model producing more rule breaks than the human participants). The average number of 
moves to completion also differs significantly between the model and human data. This discrepancy is 
discussed below. We argue that while it is an essential component of older children’s performance, the 
final outcome on each task is reliant on a number of other processes. This interpretations fit well both 
with diversity accounts and studies emphasizing a strong involvement of inhibition on tasks of 
executive functions, including the Tower of London (Miyake et al., 2000). 
Table 3. Summary of behavior of older children and model 2 
 5-6 yr olds Model 2 t(df=32) p 
Configuration (%) 96.05 100.00 –1.32 0.196 
Colors (%) 94.74 95.05 –0.71 0.483 
Rule breaks (%) 21.92 30.47 –2.05 0.049 
Avg. no. moves 9.79 7.17 2.70 0.011 
 
The Older Child model adds an important feature that serves to inhibit actions based on simple and 
direct perceptual biases. These biases are suppressed via a rule that triggers a deeper search of the 
problem state. The effects of this mechanism within the Monitoring & Goal Generation process is in 
  
reducing the chances of the model being ‘led astray’ by superficial characteristics of the problem and 
increasing the proportion of balls being placed in their correct color position. 
5 General discussion 
The models presented here integrate a number of aspects from the work by Fox and Das (2000) and 
Norman and Shallice (1986) to achieve a framework capable of testing a candidate role of inhibition 
on the Tower of London. Overall, these models demonstrate a good fit of the key dependent measures 
of task completion and rule breaks for 3-4 and 5-6 year olds. 
The effect of the simple perceptual bias enables moves to be made towards the configuration of a goal. 
Determining which ball to move and which peg to place it at is a result of competition within an 
interactive-activation based network; with the level of configural similarity governing the amount of 
excitation competing nodes receive. If configural similarity is high and either no strategies apply, or 
more extensive processing is required to apply a strategy, this bias has a stronger possibility of 
influencing a move to configuration, increasing the chances of only a partially complete solution. 
In our analysis we included a number of additional measures including average number of moves 
made on problems. Of some interest is the difference on this measure between Model 1 (6.8) and 
Model 2 (7.17) compared to the younger children (11.26) and the older children (9.79). Here, our 
models do not match the patterns observed in the child data but appear to show a slight cross-over 
interaction. The causes for the differences between the younger and older children may be attributable 
to their initial lack of apparent willingness to move balls away from the current state when the 
configuration matched closely that of the goal state. This may have been further compacted in 
instances where one ball was in its correct color position and where the goal to match the desired 
configuration was strongest. Though delayed within the children’s behavior, backtracking was a 
feature of many children’s behavior as it was within both models. However, whereas the models took 
immediate steps to backtrack and investigate other strategies, the children appeared to delay. Further 
work is necessary to clarify this account. 
The models described here accurately simulate the performance of the younger and older children on 
the other dependent measures. The close fit of our models for the data on rule breaks is in our view a 
distinctive feature of this work. Not only do the models mirror the shift in performance on the 
proportion of balls in their correct position between younger and older children, but they also simulate 
the reduction of rule breaks. Both these results are a consequence of one view of the possible role that 
inhibition may play in problem solving on the Tower of London. This view established in the Older 
Child model was built on conceptualizations offered by Miyake et al (2000) and the implementation 
given to inhibition within this model accounts for a shift in performance, from one resembling the 
behavior of 3-4 year olds to one resembling the behavior of 5-6 year olds. 
Furthermore, rather than indicating the need for one process to control overall functioning, these 
models demonstrate behaviors that are the result of a range of interacting processes. Although in the 
second model, the role given to inhibition is instrumental in accounting for specific differences 
between the Younger Child and Older Child models, influences of both strategies and the perceptual 
bias converge to affect performance. Thus, these models strongly favor diversity views of executive 
functions. 
The work presented here is consistent with the view that younger children’s poorer performance on the 
Tower of London is a product of their failure to inhibit simpler strategies. In contrast to the view that 
younger and older children possess qualitatively different cognitive strategies these models 
demonstrate that a lack of ability to inhibit may mask the existence of more complex skills. 
The account offered here is a functional one. In this paper we have demonstrated that a computational 
implementation of inhibition can explain differences in performance between younger and older 
children. However, it remains to be explained what drives the development of mechanisms that 
underlie cognitive development. 
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